Henrich, Durkheim, and my value structure theory

Key evidence for the collective is individuals’ cooperation in transmitting information. He does not directly explain how values survive, but his framework is key to understanding how cooperative efforts transmit values. He claims a sort of collective brain within groups, and we should keep in mind one of the three main sources he cites. Consider an Inuit tribe that lost technology such as Kayaks and Bows after the elders who understood it died in an epidemic. This example emphasizes the importance of knowledge transmission and how, if a group is too small, it risks losing technology when the few people who understand it die without passing it on. A single Inuit tribe could not maintain collective knowledge because of its isolation and lack of members to pass it on. When, years later, they regained contact with another Inuit tribe, they almost immediately regained the knowledge and tools previously held. He noticed this trend across tribes. As a group becomes isolated or shrinks, he noticed the size of the group’s toolkit also shrinks. The collective brain then needs more people to transmit information effectively. Large groups exponentially accelerate knowledge transmission and tool development far beyond what individuals could accomplish.

Durkheim addresses a far different position than Henrich. Henrich assumes cooperation as a means for transmitting information, whereas Durkheim understands this as a niche-specific culture. He assumes information transfer within a specific niche. This is exactly how trades form, and professions grow and develop. The real problem Durkheim attempts to solve is not transmission, but intergroup cooperation rather than isolation. At its root, specialization isolates individuals in different niches. However, as Durkheim explains, these niches are still dependent on each other for needs their own niche cannot provide. New cooperative bonds form within niches, not bonds of direct information transmission, but bonds of cooperation and negotiation to structure around the sharing of niche-specific goods and services, or whatever else the niche provides. Bakers provide bread for doctors, who in return provide medical services for the baker. These are not information-based bonds, but service-based bonds. Intergroup bonds hold large societies together, despite specialization.

My argument builds upon both Durkheim and Henrich for different purposes. To expand the argument for cooperation to include value transmission between individuals, it must begin at the small-scale level of group information transmission. This is where Henrich’s argument comes into play. He answers the question of the purpose of intragroup cooperation. Why do individuals cooperate with other individuals? His answer is for information transmission. Creating a sort of collective mind between group members, where they share information freely and help pass down that information to the next generation. His work on intergenerational transmission shows a strong example of using knowledge from 5 previous generations to accurately recreate images not directly known to a later generation. In one study group, participants had access to only one previous generation of knowledge, and they struggled to recreate an image, with some not even turning in an answer. In another study group, participants had access to the previous 5 generations of information, and later generations were extremely accurate in recreating the original image. Evolutionarily, intragroup information transmission is necessary to pass information reliably between individuals and generations.

Building on this principle, intragroup value transmission follows a similar pattern. First, we should define what a value is. A value is a prioritization structure. Individuals do not have unlimited time, energy, or resources, so they make choices daily, whether conscious or unconscious. Those choices typically reflect what the individual believes will benefit them most. These daily preferences become deeply embedded in our psychology. In a group, we must answer why an individual with self-interest will cooperate with another individual with self-interest. Social punishment is a biological system where the group rewards prosocial behavior and punishes antisocial behavior. Natural selection drives our instincts toward what helps us live the longest and reproduce. Through these biological processes, we learned to prioritize cooperation within a group, which largely aligns with Henrich’s theories of intragroup cooperation. What must an individual prioritize to cooperate within a group? He must learn fairness, loyalty, and honesty, among many other cooperative traits. These make him largely dependent on others for survival, but he enters a social contract with group members to follow these norms. Not following group norms leads to exile, or even death, and later becomes embedded in societal laws that enforce social norms to maintain cooperation as society grows. Fundamentally, a value is what we prioritize to survive and cooperate best in our individual lives.

Intragroup cooperation operates as a negotiation of values between group members. Individuals with selfish wants and needs must learn to compromise with others to prioritize values that best fit the group, not just themselves. The intragroup cooperative process of information transmission acts as a vessel for value negotiations. I must have a reason to transmit information, and you must have a reason to listen. Meaning you must value the information I offer, and I must value giving it to you. However, groups don’t just sit around and share information; they also work together toward common goals. A major reason for information transmission is this cooperative effort toward a common goal. For example, a group of hunters works together to take down a large mammoth. Members must negotiate a strategy and understand each member’s strengths and weaknesses to divide into roles. This division of roles reflects each individual’s personal values within the group. They can do the job that fits them best, but for the benefit of the group as a whole. This is an example of a successful negotiation between group members.

Beyond negotiating individual value representation, the group must align on unified goals and processes to achieve them. This marks the transition from individual values to group values, following Schwartz’s self-transcendence model. When deciding on goals, individuals must present what they value for consideration. In the end, that which receives the most support, often with some compromise or changes to an individual’s values, will become the values of the group. To reiterate, the group’s values are what the group prioritizes. Using the example of hunters. If the group decides to hunt a mammoth and store the meat to feed the larger group for winter, they will prioritize their daily actions around accomplishing this goal. Understanding this correlation between values and priority structures is critical. What an individual values is what he will prioritize. Similarly, a group’s priorities arise from negotiating individual values to find a common purpose among members.

Moving up the chain, intergroup values arise from negotiations of intragroup values. This is where my theory moves from Henrich’s intragroup information transmission theory to Durkheim’s intergroup cooperation theory. The new cooperative bonds Durkheim describes directly affect value negotiation between groups. A baker values medical treatment, just as a doctor values baked goods. Just because their niche does not prioritize providing the other’s services does not mean they do not want what the other provides. Thus, the two groups exchange goods and services to meet each other’s needs. This process does not arise out of nowhere; the groups must negotiate a fair trade policy to create a mutually beneficial system. Each group has its own values, and those values must be respected in the intragroup cooperative negotiations. If one group’s values are not equally represented, then that group will not agree to trade with the other. A group that does not represent another’s values risks isolating itself and not receiving the other group’s services at all.

So, because each group values the other group’s services, it must represent that group’s values fairly and understand which values the groups share. A good example is exchanging goods and services for money. Society agrees on the value of money and negotiates prices for goods and services around that value. If one bakery raises prices above what other groups are willing to pay, it risks losing support from other groups. Groups cannot risk isolating themselves in this way, so they fairly price their goods and services at the agreed-upon rate. In this way, groups constantly negotiate and renegotiate the value of their own niche and other niches. Cooperation between groups depends on groups agreeing on intergroup values.

What we have discussed so far explains how individuals’ value structures are represented in groups, and how a single group’s value structure is represented in intergroup cooperation. This does not explain how groups come to understand leadership between groups. Or how societies cooperate to organize themselves around a common system of defense, infrastructure, and other public services.